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INFORMATION AND NORMAL BACKWARDATION AS DEtERMINANTS OF TRADING PERFORMANCE:
Evidence from the North-Sea Oil Forward Market

Abstract
In this paper we take advantage of a unique micro-database on forward trading in
the international petroleum market, with information on the buyer and seller in
each transaction.

We utilize transaction-specific data to test directly

predictions from the theory of normal backwardation vs. information-based
predictions of who profits in these markets.
We find that no trader groups make significant profits on interday measures.
Within the daYt however t groups likely to have superior information do make
significant profits.

The results are not supportive of normal backwardation, but

are consistent with the time pattern of information dissemination in this market-deals made during the day are widely reported only at day's end.

INFORMATION AND NORMAL BACKWARDATION AS DEr'IRMlNANTS OF TRADING PERFORMANCE:
Evidence from the North-Sea Oil Forward MarKet

Resolution of the longstanding debate over who gains and who loses in financial
markets requires data at a disaggregated level.

In this paper we take advantage

of a unique database with information on the buyer "and seller in each transaction
in a forward market to measure trading performance.

Our tests are designed to

shed light on the potential sources of differential returns to participants in
forward and futures markets.

We examine trading performance to assess the

empirical relevance of two potential sources of differential returns:

insurance

and information.
Behind the insurance view is the theory of "normal backwardation," dating back to
'eynes (1930) and Hicks (1946).

The theory treats these markets as arenas wherein

risk-averse "hedgers," firms that produce or utilise the physical commodity,
purchase insurance from "speculators," who do not.

Until the 1980s, the bulk of

the research literature on forward and futures markets was based on the normalbackwardation assumption (see, e.g., Kawai 1983).1
An alternative (but not mutually exclusive) explanation of trader performance is
based on information.

That differential information can affect prices and profits

in financial markets has been demonstrated formally in recent research (e.g.,
Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, Kyle 1985). A literature has developed based on
asymmetrically-informed market participants, with the less-informed referred to as
"noise traders."Z

1The literature outside this tradition (e.g., Telser and Higginbotham
contrast, is relatively fragmented and sparse.
2Shleifer and Summers

(1990)

provide an overview of this literature.

1977,

Telser

1981,

Williams

1987),

in
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The classic theory of normal backwardation yields the testable hypothesis that, on
average, speculators should gain and hedgers should lose in these markets.

More

recently, a literature based on portfolio theory (e.g., the Capital Asset Pricing
Model) has pointed out that the traditional normal-backwardation approach
implicitly assumes that claims on hedgers' profits (e.g.; equity) cannot be
marketed costlessly.

Models based on the opposite assumption--that forward and

futures markets are perfectly integrated with markets for other assets--yield the
conclusion that risk premia are not related to hedging, because speculators can
costlessly enter futures and forward markets, and diversify the nonsystematic risk
assumed in these markets by combining them in portfolios with other assets. 3
Hirshleifer (1988) integrates the traditional theories of risk premia based on
hedging with the portfolio approach, demonstrating that nonmarketability of claims
on profits, together with fixed costs of entering asset markets, yield predictions
similar to those of the simple normal-backwardation model.

Bessembinder (1992)

uses monthly aggregate data from a variety of futures markets to test these
predictions against those of the portfolio approach.

He finds support for Hirsh-

leifer's modern version of the normal-backwardation model, in that net hedging,
interacted with residual risk, is associated with returns in futures markets.
In contrast, the asymmetric-information view of trader performance predicts that
traders with better information will gain at the expense of uninformed or "noise"
traders.

Thus, if traders who operate in the cash (physicals) market have

superior information about future supply and demand conditions, the prediction of
the normal-backwardation model can be reversed.

30usak (1973) was the first to attempt to relate returns on futures contracts and the systematic risk emphasized in
portfolio theory, finding no significant relationship.

L
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Typically, though, the only data that are publicly available are prices and market
volumes; thus, transactions by hedgers and speculators have not been
distinguished.

Faced with this obstacle, economists have fallen back on

attempting to detect risk premia in price data, as evidence of the insurance fees
predicted by normal backwardatiun.

In contrast,. our information on the parties to

and terms of each trade allows a direct test of the role of these two potential
sources of differential trading performance.

We construct trading accounts for

each type of company in the database, and use these accounts to test whether
hedgers lose and speculators gain in this market.
Recent papers by Hartzmark (1987,1991) are the only other attempt to utilise
information on individual traders to test whether on average speculators gain and
hedgers lose in these markets.

Hartzmark's data, disaggregated by individual

trader rather than individual trade, do not support the normal-backwardation
theory.4

In contrast, empirical studies based on aggregate data have found support

for the normal backwardation theory (e.g., Chang 1985).5 These studies, like
Hartzmark's, were obliged to rely on data from U.S. markets, as well as on the
arbitrary definition of "large" used by the U.S. Conunodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC).6
4Utilising end-of-day position data in nine futures markets. Hartzmark finds that large hedgers actually make
significantly positive (at the 5% level) returns overall. while large speculators' returns differed insignificantly
from zero.

Large hedgers' returns were positive in eight of the nine markets.

5Hartzmark (1987.1991) are the only papers employing disaggregated data. The pioneering paper by Houthakker
(1957). as well as the very few other empirical studies in this literature (e.g .• Bessembinder 1992; see Hartzmark
1987 for citations) have relied on data that were highly aggregated over traders. time. or both.
6The data used in previous studies come from the CFTC, which requires "large traders" (the threshold number of
contracts for "large" depends on the conmodity) to report their positions daily. and to identify these positions as
"commercial" (i.e .• there were offsetting commitments in the cash market) or non-commercial (no offsetting
commitments). Below the regulatory threshold. traders are considered "sma"" and are not required to report their
positions to the CFTC. A given firm can change categories based on its behaviour in a given month, or on the
periodic changes in the thresholds. In the aggregate studies. as well as Hartzmark's. small traders are treated as
a residual. and assumed to be speculators.

As futures trading is a zero-sum game. Hartzmark's results imply that
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This paper undertakes transaction-based tests in a very different arena--the
international forward market for petroleum.

The microdata we use have two

important advantages for testing hypotheses about winners and losers in financial
markets.

First, as noted above, our information pertains to each individual

transaction, rather than just end-of-day position
available to previous researchers.
Second, the data indicate the

~

data~

all that has been

Thus we are able to examine intraday trading.
of companies involved in each transaction.

These types (discussed further below) conform more closely to intuitive notions of
speculators and hedgers than the arbitrary CFTC dichotomies of large vs. small and
commercial vs. non-commercial positions upon which previous studies have been
forced to rely.7
The petroleum forward market is organised quite differently from a futures market.
All trading is bilateral; there is no clearinghouse, no open outcry, no
centralised exchange. 8 Only at the end of the trading day is information on deals
negotiated during the day widely disseminated.

During the day, traders must rely

on their contacts for information on the transactions consummated. 9 We take
small participants made significant losses in these markets.
7Moreover, our types are defined by firms' long-run position in the industry, and not by their trading behaviour in
a particular month. Of course. firms that produce and/or consume a good often engage in speculation as well.
While it is impossible to be certain when a company that produces or consumes a good is hedging or speculating
without knowing its future commitments in the cash (physicals) market at the time, such firms differ fundamentally
from those that neither produce nor consume the good; the latter can profit only by on average selling relatively
high and/or buying relatively low.
8Transactions are consummated via teiephone and telex; the terms are not public knowledge.

All the data on this

market are obtained by survey by firms that specialise in information collection and dissemination; one of these
firms, Petroleum Argus, maintains the historical microdatabase used in this study.

Detailed information on the

market can be found in Mabro et al (1986), Sas (1987a,b), and Weiner (1989).
9Subscribers to the services of the survey companies in this market receive an electronic report at the end of each
trading day that includes individual transactions consummated that day.

During the day, periodic price

"assessments," in the form of bid/ask quotes, are sent out by the various survey companies, but these quotes are
not necessarily based on actual transactions.
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advantage of the timing of information dissemination in this market to identify
intraday performance with asymmetric information, and interday performance with
the risk premia associated with normal backwardation.
The decentralised nature of this market allows us to· isolate the role of
asymmetric information as a determinant of trader performance.

Unlike futures

markets, price and quantity data here are not instantaneously available to market
participants.

Thus, to the extent that models of asymmetric information are

relevant in understanding financial markets, they ought to receive empirical
support here.
This setting should also be better suited than a futures market for testing the
prediction of the normal-backwardation model regarding risk premia. 10 As discussed
below, entry into this forward market is far more costly than in futures markets.
Individual investors cannot participate in the forward market, unless they are
willing to participate in the physicals market as well.
Thus risk premia need not be competed away by an infinitely elastic supply of
speculators.

Failure to detect evidence of risk premia here would constitute

stronger evidence against normal backwardation than it would in a futures market,
where entry is relatively easy.

This is important because the absence of free

entry into speculation implies that the risk premia predicted by the theory of
normal backwardation need not be driven to zero. ll Thus if normal backwardation

laThe substantial price fluctuations in the underlying commodity, crude oil, should also serve to make this market
a good laboratory for empirical research on risk premia.
11S ee the discussion above and Hirsh1eifer (1988).
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drives results in commodity markets, it should be more easily detectable here than
in futures markets, where entry by small-scale speculators is relatively easy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.
institutions and the database.

Section II discusses market

The methodology for estimation· of traders' gains

and losses is presented in Section III.

Empirical results are reported in

Sections IV and V for the interday accounts, and Section VI for the intraday
accounts.

II.

Section VII offers some conclusions.

The Brent Forward Market: Organisation and Data

The commodity traded is Brent Blend crude oil, a type of crude oil produced in the
North Sea, which is one of the largest oil-producing areas in the world.
"Brent market" combines aspects of forward and futures contracting.

The

As regards

the former, all transactions are entered into bilaterally (in the absence of an
exchange or clearinghouse), no margins are put up, and entering into an agreement
requires the ability to take or make delivery should that be necessary (i.e.,
entering into an offsetting contract does not confer the right to automatic cash
settlement).

Contracts are governed by U.K. commercial law, but are denominated

in U.S. dollars, the currency for virtually all international trade in crude oil.
Despite these characteristics of forward markets, the Brent market is primarily
one of financial transactions--a feature usually associated with futures trading.
Although no automatic right to financial settlement exists, over 90% of all
contracts are settled financially, rather than through delivery.12 Contracts are
12Financial settlement before contract maturity is referred to in this market as "booking out."

In the absence of

a clearinghouse, trading is not anonymous, so it necessary to keep track of the parties that have made commitments
for future purchase and delivery.
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standardised, as in a futures market, with all contract terms, save price, preestablished. 13

In addition, formal futures trading of Brent contracts was

successfully introduced by the International Petroleum Exchange in July 1988. 14
Each record in the database represents a transaction, containing the date,
contract maturity, type of buyer, type of seller, and price.

As part of the

agreement between the survey company and the respondents, individual trader
records are not disclosed, but rather aggregated by type.

Thus we will be unable

to detect heterogeneity of trader performance within a given type. 1S Table 1
summarises the trader types, and indicates their relative size in terms of numbers
of reported transactions.

13Contract size is standardised at 500,000 barrels (600,000 barrels from 1985 through July 1988). roughly one
tanker cargo. and delivery point at Sullom Voe, the Shetland Islands.

Forward contracts in this market have the

same maturity structure as futures contracts; maturity is for a given month in the future (not for a given number
of days in the future. as in the forward market for foreign exchange), and ranges from zero (spot transactions) to
5-6 months, with the bulk of trading for 1-3 months forward. There are no price-move or position limits.
14Crude oil futures trading has been active since its reintroduction by the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) in
early 1983, and covers the period of our database, July 1983 through the end of 1989.
forward market was about 15% of the size of the futures market during this period.

In volume terms, the Brent

The type of crude oil traded on

the NYHEX is known as West Texas Intermediate (WTI). Crude oil is not a homogeneous commodity, and the many types
of crude oil are imperfect substitutes, varying in how much gasoline, fuel oil, and other petroleum products they
yield when refined.

Price movements are imperfectly correlated across crude oil types. in part because demand

shocks (e.g., weather, coal strikes, air travel demand) tend to be specific to refined petroleum products.
ISTwo questions of data reliability arise when using survey information: 1) sample representativeness, and 2)
respondents' incentives to reply truthfully. Neither is likely to be a serious problem here. The market is small
enough, and reputation important enough, that whom to survey is not an issue. The survey is carried out every
business day. and tries to reach all buyers and sellers in the market. rather than a sample of them.
transactions verified by both buyer and seller are registered.

Only

A check of the effectiveness of the procedure

reported in Habra et al (1986) estimated that the survey succeeded in registering roughly two-thirds of all
transactions.

The quality of the data is sufficiently high that the prices reported are very widely used in the

petroleum industry as a basis for price-setting in long-term sales contracts for other types of crude oil
(Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 1989).

Trader reluctance to admit to having made a very good or a very poor bargain

could bias our tests regarding "search account," profitability (described below) toward the null.

TABLE 1:
Code

TRADER TYPES,

Company Type

CHARACTERISTr~,

Sales

Purchases

AND NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS
Description (example)

Companies with upstream or downstream capacity
I

integrated

2900

3171

upstream and downstream capacity
(Amoco)

M

major

5984

5634

very large integrated firms,
operate the market (Shell)

N

national

157

185

state-owned enterprise, which
would otherwise fall under I,P,R

P

producer

483

389

upstream capacity only (Hamf)ton)

R

refiner

981

1152

downstream capacity only (AShland)

Companies with neither upstream nor downstream capacity
S

sogo shosha

T

trading company

u
W

Note:

Japanese general trading companies
(Mitsui)

3731

3225

10264

10578

unidentified

3039

3150

companies that could not be
classified by the survey

Wall Street

4637

4692

u.S. investment banks (Dreyfus)

other than S (Marc Rich)

Total number of transactions (equals sales equals purchases) is 32176.

transactions between companies within the same category and swaps.
collectively exhaustive.

The statistical work below excludes

The categories are mutually exclusive and

A list of companies by category is given in Petroleum Argus (1987).
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The Trading Accounts

We construct two different accounts for each type of company, based on these
individual transactions, in order to test for differential performance, and to
determine the source of any performance differentials found.

In-addition, we

conduct non-parametric tests of forecasting ability developed by Merton (1981) and
Henriksson and Merton (1981).
We first construct an account that measures interday performance, which we term
the holding account.

The holding account captures the profits that traders make

on a given day on their open positions, based on price movements for the relevant
contracts, and parallels the accounts constructed by earlier researchers in not
relying on individual-transaction data. 16
The normal backwardation hypothesis predicts holding-account profits for
speculators and losses for hedgers, given the non-marketable risks combined with
transactions costs associated with participating in the market discussed above.
In contrast, the asymmetric-information theory would predict neither gains nor
losses for any trader-type on the holding account, given the pattern of
information dissemination in this market (see text and footnote 9 above), provided
that traders had similar access to information about events other than the terms
of deals consummated privately in this market.
Next we construct an account that measures intraday performance, which we term
the search account.

The search account captures traders ability to make (or to

160ur holding-account calculations are thus subject to the same limitations as the previous literature in the area
of determining trader profitability in financial markets--profits and losses on positions held for less than one
trading day will not register.
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time) "good deals," measured as the amount above the daily mean (for the relevant
contract maturity) a seller obtained, or the amount below the daily mean a buyer
paid on each transaction.

Again given the pattern of information dissemination in

this market, the asymmetric-information theory would predict that traders with
superior information would register gains on the search account.

A.

Holding Account

Our method of construction is the same as previous authors', except for the prices
that we use as the basis for posting gains and losses.

In the absence of an .

exchange, there is no closing price for each forward contract.

The choices

available to us to proxy for the unobserved closing forward prices are 1) the
closing prices for the corresponding futures contracts on the New York Mercantile
Exchange; 2) the closing spot price; and 3) the average of the forward prices for
each maturity.
The calculations reported below use the closing futures prices. I7 Use of futures
prices introduces noise into the estimation of traders' performance because of the
imperfect correlation between prices of the types of crude oil traded on the
forward and futures markets. 18
17 In addition, the accounts were constructed using end-of-day spot prices, which effectively assumes away basis
risk between spot and forward contracts.

The last measure, the average of forward prices for each maturity, is not

utilised because these prices reflect the ability of the transacting parties to seek out favorable terms of trade
in a market without centralised trading.

This aspect of trading performance is discussed further below.

18Although the two types of crude oil are quite similar, their prices do not move in lock-step together, due to
transport costs in combination with local supply and demand effects (see footnote 14 above), and to differences in
the timing of price reporting.

The correlation between daily returns (measured in the usual manner as the

logarithm of price changes) on the nearby NYMEX futures contract and the assessment (see footnote 9 above) for the
nearby Brent forward contract over the period 1988-1991 was 0.745. Crude oil futures trading on the NYHEX halts at
3:10 PM Eastern time. Since forward trading is informal, it could in principle take place around the clock. In
practice, the westernmost oil trading center is Houston, and the end-of-day survey reports are issued at 5 PH

, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------- - - - - - - - - -
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Gains and losses calculated using closing futures prices were then cumulated over
time to produce figures comparable to previous studies.
measures profits associated with open

pos~tions

The holding account

at the end of each trading day.

The account reflects, inter alia, market participants' ability to forecast price
changes from one day to the next, given the information available to them.
equation form, the holding account for the

jth

In

trader-type on day t, Hjt , is:
(1)

where m is contract maturity, p is the price for a contract of maturity m, and Q
is the trader-type's open interest in contracts of maturity m at the close of the
preceding business day.19 Short positions are characterised by Q<O, so that
traders who are short make money on the holding account when prices fall.

Of

course, the sum across traders of profits is zero each day <Lj Hjt = 0 for all t).
B.

Tests of Forecasting Ability

The holding account can record gains or losses that are statistically significant,
even if a trader-type lacks forecasting ability.

If futures prices rise

(respectively, fall) over a given period, then traders who tend to be long for
commercial reasons, e.g. refiners (respectively, short, e.g. producers), will post
significant gains, even in the absence of forecasting ability, as long as price
changes are not completely anticipated. 2o

Houston time (6 PM Eastern time; Petroleum Argus, communication).

Exchange-rate movements are not an issue. since

as noted above, both contracts are denominated in U.S. dollars.

19When

spot prices are used to construct the accounts, the right-hand-side of

(1)

reduces to the spot price change

multiplied by the trader-type's net open position across all contract maturities.
200ver the entire period the spot price declined substantially, from roughly $30 to roughly $20 per barrel.

DETERMINANTS OF TRADING PERFORMANCE, page 12
The difference between posting holding-account gains and exhibiting forecasting
ability corresponds to the difference between the unconditional probability of
being on the "right side of the market" (long when prices are rising, short when
they are falling) and conditional probability of being on the right side of the
market, given that prices are rising or falling.
We adapt methods for assessing market-timing performance developed by Merton
(1981), Henriksson and Merton (1981), and Cumby and Modest (1987), and applied to

futures markets by Chang (1985) and Hartzmark (1991).21 The tests that HenrikssonMerton (hereafter, H-M) develop are nonparametric, based on observing both
predicted and actual changes in the variable being forecast.

In the case of the

forward market, we assume that traders' predictions are indicated by their net
positions.

In the absence of hedging, traders should hold long positions when

they expect prices to rise, and short positions when they expect prices to fall.
The H-M test consists of summing the conditional probabilities of a correct
position, given a price decrease, estimated as Nll/N. l in the contingency table
below, and a price increase, estimated as Nz2 /N. 2• H-M demonstrate that the random
variables in the contingency tables have hypergeometric distributions, with
parameters N, Nl ., and N. l , which enables statistical inference.

TRADER
POSITION

short
long
total

down
Nll
NZl
N. l

PRICE CHANGE
up
tota 1
N1Z
Nl .
Nzz
N. z

Nz.
N

N1j = # of observations
in cell i,j

ZlMerton (1981) demonstrates that a necessary condition for forecasting ability (interpreted in our context) is
that the conditional probabilities of being on the right side of the market, given a price increase and a price
decrease respectively, must sum to more than one. A producer. e.g., whose position is always short, is on the
right side of the market with probability one when prices decline, but on the right side with probability zero when
they rise, and thus would exhibit no forecasting ability. See references for further details.
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Cumby and Modest (hereafter, C-M, 1987) demonstrate two limitations of the H-M
test.

First, it is not very powerful against plausible alternatives; and second,

it is valid only if returns are independent over time. 22 C-M develop a regressionbased test under the assumption that the conditional expectation of the return
depends linearly on the trader's forecast; the -test consists of regressing the
observed return (logarithm of the price change in this case) on a constant and an
indicator variable, set equal to one for long positions, zero for short positions.
If a trader-type has forecasting ability, the coefficient on this variable will be
positive (i.e., long positions will be associated with price increases).
The C-M approach is more powerful than the nonparametric tests, and does not rely
on the independence assumption.

Of course, regression-based tests have the draw-

back of assuming normality of forecast errors.

As neither approach is a priori

superior, we conducted both the H-M nonparametric and C-M regression-based tests.

c.

Search Account

In addition to these measures of interday performance, a "search account" was
constructed in attempt to measure companies' abilities to find "good deals" in a
market with no open outcry, and non-instantaneous dissemination of information.
In the absence of a normal-backwardation rationale for their presence in the
market, traders that neither produce nor consume the commodity could survive by
making trading profits through the ability to locate and take advantage of
bargains faster than other types of companies. 23
22 If traders use technical analysis in taking positions (e.g., filter rules), then the independence assumption will
be violated.

For example. decisions based on troughs or peaks could lead to many small gains and a few big losses

(or conversely), resulting in frequency-based tests, such as H-M's. giving misleading results.
23 The imperfect correlation between prices of Brent and WTI noted above implies that information-gathering in the
forward market requires more than merely watching futures prices. Clearly. search-account gains and losses can
result from intraday price fluctuation as well as differing abilities to find "good deals." Unfortunately. the

DETERMINANTS OF TRADING

PER~RMANCE,

page 14

For each forward-contract maturity, we calculate for each day an average price,
based on all transactions in that maturity (unweighted; recall that transaction
size is standardised).

Each transaction that takes place above the average price

results in a gain, equal to the difference from the average, being posted to the
seller and a similar loss to the buyer, with analogous calculations for
transactions taking place below the average price.
To construct each trader-type's search account each day, the gains and losses
associated with individual transactions must be aggregated.

Since these gains and

losses are themselves estimated as the difference between the price associated
with the individual transaction and the average price for all transactions of the
relevant contract maturity, the standard error of estimate will differ between
transactions of different contract maturities, so that constructing the search
account via an unweighted average would be inappropriate.
In constructing the account, each gain or loss for the given trader-type was
weighted by the inverse of the estimated variance of prices for the contract on
which the gain or loss was incurred.

In equation form, each trader-type's search-

account performance on day t was calculated as a weighted sum, Sjt:
wm = 1/am2

(2)

where the time subscript is suppressed for clarity on the RHS, m indexes contract
maturity, i indexes transact ions by the

exact time of each transaction is unavailable.

jth

trader type in the mth contract

Even when prices tend to rise or fall throughout the day, unless

some types of companies systematically trade earlier in the day when prices are rising, or later in the day when
prices are falling, the effects of intraday price variation will tend to cancel.

DETERMINANTS OF TRADING

PER~RMANCE,

maturity, and the summations are over i and m.

The

associated with each of its transactions is

= (Pmij

transaction price,

Pm

Smij

jth
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trader's gain or loss
- Pm)Imij'

where Pmij is the

is the average price across all transactions of the relevant

contract maturity and I is an indicator variable, equal to one for sales and
negative one for purchases.

W
m is the weight, nj the number of transactions by the

trader-type for the day, and

u~

the variance of the estimated gain or loss on the

transaction. 24 The variance is estimated from all the transactions by all traders
in the given contract maturity on day t.
The daily search account represents an estimate of a trader-type's ability to do
better than the average of all traders.

To assess the statistical significance of

the estimate, a standard error must be calculated:

(3)

where the variables and summation are as before, and the time subscript is again
suppressed on the RHS.
for any time period.

The same procedure serves to generate the search account
The daily search accounts are aggregated with weights as in

(2), with the weights now being the daily variances that were calculated through
(3) .

IV.

Holding Account:

Results

Table 2 presents the results of constructing the holding-accounts for each tradertype for the entire period.

For each trader-type, the table provides total

24Thus the estimated gain or loss on each transaction is weighted by its corresponding element in the covariance
matrix. See lehman (1990).
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TABLE 2: HOLDING ACCOUNT
A. GAINS AND LOSSES BY TRADER TYPE
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
NET POSITION

I
-59079
76536
-3297

M

-121
134892
-26731

N
2463
31049
1024

P
18957
35993
-3020

R
9498
60279
2023

S
T
13761 149283
69093 239342
7860 12004

U

W

23696 -158858
86945 126521
1777
8360

B. GAINS AND LOSSES BY POTENTIAL HEDGERS ('I' ,'M' ,'N' ,'P' ,'R', and sometimes 'W')
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
NET POSITION

excluding 'W'
-27882
173120
-30001

including 'W'
-186740
227818
-21641

Note:
I integrated Mmajor N national P producer R refiner S shosha T trading co. U unident. WWall St.
Totals and standard errors in thousands of dollars. net position in number of contracts. Significance levels (2-tailed test)
a - lOX. b - 5X

profits (calculated as tile sum of daily holding profits), and its standard error;
negative signs indicate losses.

Only the levels of returns are indicated; because

no margin capital need be put up, there is no natural denominator for calculating
rates of return.

The table also indicates the size of each trader-type in terms

of net open interest (i.e., the stock of contracts outstanding), with positive
signs indicating long positions and negative signs, short positions. 25

Table 2B presents the holding account totals aggregated by whether trader-types
are potential hedgers--i.e., possess production or consumption capacity.

The

25Table 3A below provides an analogous indication of trader size in terms of total trading volume (i.e., flow of
contracts signed).
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leftmost five columns of Table 2A fall into this category; the remaining four
columns represent trading companies--traders with no production or consumption to
hedge--who are the speculators in this market.

The table also presents figures

with the Wall Street banks included in the hedger category, because this group
sells hedging services to companies that engage in production or consumption of
the physical commodity, often through tailored long-term commodity swaps.
Over the entire period, no trader-type posted a gain or loss that is significant
at the 10% level, nor did the hedgers as a group, whether or not the Wall Street
banks are included.

Of course, the speculators (however defined) also broke even

on the holding account, since their balances are just those of the hedgers with
the signs reversed.
The holding accounts were also constructed for each trader-type for each six-month
period from 1983:2 to 1989:2. 26 The subperiod breakdowns are calculated because
the market has evolved over time.

Some subperiods have witnessed sharp price

fluctuations, while others have been calm. 27 The normal-backwardation hypothesis
predicts that the insurance premium paid by hedgers to speculators for taking on
risk will be greater in periods of higher volatility. Thus, hedgers should
register larger holding-account losses during these periods.

26periods start in January and July.

No correction for seasonality was made; Dominguez (1991) examined returns on

WTI crude oil futures contracts over this period, finding no evidence of seasonality in returns.

The same result

was obtained for WTI spot prices by Garbade (1991).
27Historical volatility levels have fluctuated; standard deviations of percentage daily price changes ranged from
less than lOX to about 20X per year before 1986. rose dramatically to around 40X to over 100X per year in 1986,
then fell back to the 20 to 60X per year range in the late 1980s. Although after the period of our sample,
analogous volatility figures published by the NYMEX for the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 exceed 100X per year.

· '-
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Of the 101 subperiod balances (13 subperiods for 8 trade r-typ es,
less 3 cases
where a trade r-typ e was inact ive for a subperiod), only two were
stati stica lly
signi fican t at the 5% (and three at the 10%) level (two- tailed test)
, fewer than
the number expected by chance. When the accounts were aggregated
by whether
trade r-typ es are poten tial hedgers, not one of the 13 subperiod figur
es for hedger
and specu lator profi ts diffe red stati stica lly from zero at the 1~
signi fican ce
28
1eve1.
Following Bessembinder (1992), we also constructed the holding accou
nt balances
conditional on the poten tial hedgers' being net long and net short
as a group.
Whereas Bessembinder, relying on CFTC data, finds that futur es contr
acts tend to
have higher retur ns when hedgers are net short than net long, our
conditional
holding-account balances, like the unconditional balances reported
above, do not
differ" from zero for any trade r-typ e at conventional signi fican ce
level s.
Bessembinder tests the portf olio theory against Hirsh leife r's moder
n version of
the normal backwardation approach by regressing futur es return s on
measures of 1)
systematic risk, and 2) residual risk in the relev ant futur es marke
t, intera~ted
with a varia ble indic ating when hedgers (as defined by the CFTC)
are long or
short . His finding of a relati onshi p between retur ns and residual
risk,
intera cted with hedging posit ion, provides support for the latte r.
We performed a modified version of Bessembinder's tests , taking advan
tage of our
abili ty to distin guish commercials' and noncommercia1s' trans actio
ns. The daily
holding-account balances of the "pote ntial hedgers" group (see Table
2B) were

28Because the subperiod balances are all null. they are omitted
here in the interes ts of space.
figures are availab le in the working paper version of this article
(Philli ps and Weiner 1991).

Tables with these
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regressed against the estimated standard deviation of returns on futures contracts
and an indicator variable for the sign of this group's net position:

(4)

where the summation is over the commercial trader types, u is the standard
deviation of returns on futures contracts (estimated from historical data, and
from implied volatility, backed out of options on NYMEX futures contracts), and I
is the indicator variable (I t = -1 if net short on day t, 1 if net long, 0 if
:ither).
and

1 did

Consistent with our findings above, the estimated coefficients
not differ from zero at the 5% significance level.

a,~,

Estimation of (4)

separately for each trader-type produced similarly insignificant results.
These tests differ from Bessembinder's in two important ways.

First, we employ

holding-account profits, rather than rates of return, as our dependent variable.
Recall that for forward contracts, no capital is invested, so that rates of return
are not meaningful.

Our holding account measures, like Bessembinder's rates of

return, will vary with futures prices.
rather than residual risk.

Second, u here is a measure of total,

Given our findings of insignificant gains and losses

above, we have not performed the extensive asset-pricing tests necessary to
decompose u into the systematic and residual components necessary to test directly
Hirshleifer's proposed form of hedging interaction with residual risk. 29 Note that
these modifications limit the comparability of these tests with Bessembinder's.

29Moreover, earlier authors (e.g., Mayshar 1981) have demonstrated total risk to be a determinant of an asset's
risk premium in the presence of transactions costs.
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V.

Forecasting Ability:

Results

The H-M nonparametric tests are unable to detect forecasting ability among any of
the nine trader-types at conventional significance levels; the smallest p-value is
0.39.

Five of the nine types perform worse than a trader guessing randomly,

although the differences are not significant at conventional levels. 3o An
examination of the subperiod results reveals evidence of forecasting ability
(i.e., the sum of the conditional probabilities exceeded one at the 10%
significance level) in only three (out of 114) cases.
As a check on whether our results are due to low power of the nonparametric
approach, we also performed the C-M regression-based tests described earlier.
Changes in the futures price were regressed on a constant and a dummy variable
that indicated whether the given trader was long or short on a given day.

In only

one of the nine cases (type E) did a trader-type's position have explanatory power
at the 10% level.

This case had the "wrong" sign; prices tended to fall when

producers were 10ng. 31 Thus the regression-based tests yield results consistent
with the earlier conclusions of no interday forecasting ability.
30For space reasons, only an illustrative matrix (for type Il is shown here.
appendix.

Full results are presented in the

The matrix indicates the number of days on which long or short positions were held, and the number of

days on which the one-month futures price rose or fell.

Also indicated are the sum of the conditional

probabilities of being on the right side of the market, given that it has risen and fallen, respectively, and the
probability that this sum differs from one, its expected value if positions were chosen randomly.

FUTURES PRICE MOVEMENT

Trading Company

TRADER
POSITION

down
294
434
728

short
long
total

sum of conditional probabilities

up
310
528
836

total
604
960
1564

= 1.03; p-value = .39

The calculations are not sensitive to which futures maturity is used, because although imperfectly correlated,
futures prices of differing maturities nearly always move in the same direction.
was unchanged are included under 'up'.
matrix.

Days on which the futures price

Days on which the trader-type held no net position are not included in its

. '-
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VI.

Search Account:

Results

A. Aggregate Performance
Table 3A pre sen ts the search acc
ounts constructed for each tra der
-ty pe for each
six-month period from 1983:2 to
1989:2, as well as for the en tir e
per iod .
Examining the en tir e period fir st,
it can be seen tha t of the four tra
de r types
tha t ne ith er produce nor ref ine
the commodity tra ded , only the sho
sha (la bel ed S)
are estimated to have made a pro
fit at the 95% confidence lev el,
about $8.7
mi llio n. Other tra din g companies
(1) are estimated to have los t aro
und $3.6
mi llio n, sig nif ica nt at the 90%
lev el. The Wall Str eet banks (~)
als o los t about
$3.6 mi llio n, sig nif ica nt at the
95% lev el. Of the oth er groups,
only the majors
(M), who run the market (and who are
thus the most lik ely to have sup
eri or
information), made a sig nif ica nt
pro fit , around $4.2 mi llio n. The
un ide nti fie d
group (M), comprising companies
unlikely to be knowledgeable abo
ut the market,
los t about $5.5 mi llio n. Gains
and losses by oth er types were not
sig nif ica nt at
the 90% lev el.
The fig ure s for the thi rte en sub
periods vary some, but are lar gel
y con sis ten t with
the aggregate res ult s. The shosha
made a pro fit every period (excep
t 1983:2, when
they had a minuscule nine tra nsa
cti on s). Other tra din g companies
los t in ten out
of the thi rte en periods. The Wa
ll Str eet Banks los t money in all
but two of the
periods they were act ive (in one
of the two, 1984:2, they had but
2 tra nsa cti on s),
as did ref ine rs. The un ide nti fie
d group los t money every period.

\

31Although producers were net sho
rt in every six-month peri od. they
were net long on 342 of the 1398
in which they held a pos itio n.
trad ing days

Table 3A:

SEARCH ACCOUNT

GAINS AND LOSSES BY TRADER TYPE
1983:2
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS

M

N

P

R

S

T

U

258
200
109

20
48

43
122
30

-76
134
32

-34
76

-105
254
150

-168
112
39

o

P
-92
96
48

R

S

U

w

-40
140
79

114
75
52

T
-329
264
423

-185
155
106

o

P
-194
225
114

R

S

T

U

589 a -3595 b
342
703
503
5

-221
277
163

155
169
172

135
405
753

-678 b
263
277

N

P

R

S

T

U

-1000 b

1

1984:1
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS

I

M

N

99
153
155

321
204
255

-37
25
4

1984:2
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS

-118
283
289

1985:1
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS
1985:2
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS

w

I

47
128
54

I

M

I

M

599
406
452

1186b

I

M

161
434
486

b

1986:1
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS

340
803
397

1986:2
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS

I
-124
446
341

I

576
570

-1149
517
786

M

-328
893
578
M

-425
672

762

N

9

55
3

-65
289
135

-256
197
80

101
304
194

-542
749
1045

N

P

R

S

T

1

-19
199
131

-625 a
360
181

624
406
416

N

P

R

S

-86

-435
615

315
232
1

N
-9
13
1

87
330
31

P

58
138
31

-424
435
122
R
-89
550
140

1504
644
459

1611
711
1389

b

448
400

b

T

-813
1051
827

S
T
b
2007 -440
783
996
666
1031

U

-858 b
433
392
U

-930
714

154
U
-359
520
166

o

o

W

-48
44
7
W

-39
84
54
W

-437
456
241

W

-518
736
596

Note:
I integrated Mmajor N national P producer R refiner S shosha T trading co. U unident. WWa 11 St.
Totals and standard errors in thousands of dollars. transactions in number of contracts. Each trade is counted
twice. once for the buyer and once for the seller.
the same trader-type.

Not counted are swaps and trades wherein the two parties are of

Significance levels (2-tailed test): a - lOX. b - 5X.

Table 3A:

SEARCH ACCOUN1--(continued)

GAINS AND LOSSES BY TRADER TYPE
1987:1
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS
1987:2
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS
1988:1
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS
1988:2
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS

N

P

R

o

-11
98
48

108
239
177
R

1

P
498a
268
79

-240
283
173

3448
746
783

N

P

R

S

I

M

124
369
356

2078 b
540
843

o

I

M

N

-956 a
564
493
I

112
634
445
I

207
382
423

20
24

353
762
1053
M

1021
666
1015
M

-248
565
753

T

S

U

W

1033 b -2251 b -419
461
610
317
615
999
277

-839·
458
607

S
b

513
485

-426
487
310

P

R

S

T

U

351 a
210
48

-275
214
18

-303
489
154

59
474
229

886
897
795

-591
471
267

N

P

R

S

T

U

W

63
197
97

-72
110

-96
176
70

21
141
58

-114
320
324

-228
329
176

698a
419
392

M

N

P

R

S

108
190
233

220 a
129

30
50
15

134 a
81
41

77
105
63

P

R

S

71

M

822
1312
4310

b

4218
1722
7728

W

N

I

I

U

-202
230
156

-33
196
215

ENTIRE PERIOD
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS

-322 -1428b
439
682
384 1019

-37
151
50

1989:2
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS

-229
246
268

W

-30
76
36

79
261
204

M

U

T
-549
743
1031

1137 b

1989:1
TOTAL
STD. ERROR
TRANSACTIONS

I

T
-176
902
1373

N

291
290
269

9

-180 -1402
548
881
739 1568

b

8663
1420
4201

T

-441 a
243
277
T

-3570 a
2133
10417

U

-65
177
171

U

-922
684 .

1070
W

-206
732
827

W

-72
221
328

W

-5455 b

-3575 b
1185 1474
3119 5143

Note:
I integrated Mmajor N national P producer R refiner S shosha T trading co. U unident. WWall St.
Totals and standard errors in thousands of dollars, net position in number of contracts. Each trade is counted
twice. once for the buyer and once for the seller.
the same trader-type.

Not counted are swaps and trades wherein the two parties are of

Significance levels (2-tailed test): a - lOX, b - 5X.
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Note also that the magnitude of the gains and losses diminishes toward the end of
the period.

As noted above, futures trading in Brent crude oil was successfully

introduced in the second half of 1988. With instantaneous dissemination of
information available, the degree of information asymmetry among market particiants should have decreased, leading to smaller magnitudes on the search account.
This result too is consistent with information-based views of trader performance.
When the search account figures are aggregated into hedger and speculator
categories (as in Table 2 above), the majors' profits are more than large enough
to offset the losses of the other hedgers.

This yields a profit over the entire

period for the group of $4.5 million (and hence, a loss for the speculators) that
is significant at conventional levels (standard error $2.2 million) when type
excluded.

Wis

Not surprisingly, aggregation across trader-types with quite disparate

performance tends to reduce the extent to which results differ significantly from
zero.

Including type

H reduces the hedgers' search account gain to $1.0 million,

with standard error $2.2 million.
B. Performance Breakdown by Trading Partner
Disaggregation of the each trader-type's search-account by trading partner allows
us to address the question of whether those types that did well (respectively,
poorly) at making deals registered their gains (respectively, losses) in
transactions with all other trader-types, or primarily with those who fared poorly
(respectively, well).
Table 3B presents an illustrative performance matrix, disaggregated by trading
partner, for those trader types that registered significant gains or losses over
the entire period in Table 3A

(M,~,I,~,

and H).

When the trader types that did
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Table 3B:

SEARCH ACCOUNT

GAINS AND LOSSES BY TRADER TYPE, DISAGGREGATED BY TRADING PARTNER
Entire Period

trader type

M

T

u

w

s

M

T

u

total
std. err.
total
std. err.

796
650

total
std. err.

-1630
1137

-3350 b

total
std. err.

-2033 b

-1195 b
374

-1655 b

total
std. err.

354
736

-2255 b

-667
835

558

917

571

718

-547
429

Note: Totals and standard errors in thousands of dollars.
Sign convention:

+

indicates that the row made money off the column; - indicates the converse.

Significance levels (2-tailed test): a - lOX, b - 5X

w
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not make significant gains or losses over the entire period are included (not
shown here, available upon request), the results suggest that the winners in Table
3A gained at the expense of the types that lost overall, rather than at the
expense of all other groups.
For example, the shosha

(~),

which performed the best, gained at the expense of

seven of the other eight groups, posting a(n insignificant) loss only in their
deals with producers.

The shosha's significant gains were all at the expense of

the other trading companies, types

I,Y,

and

~,

which all fared poorly.

made their only significant gains at the expense of types

The majors

I and M. Among the

losers, the unidentified group (Y) posted losses in its deals with all other
groups but
Neither

~,

Y nor

and the Wall Street banks
~

(~)

f.

lost to all groups but 1 and

made significant gains at the expense of any other group.

The fact that the types that profited overall (M and

~)

did not incur significant

losses to any of the other types, and the types that lost overall

(I,M,

and

W)

did

not succeed at the expense of any of the other groups suggests the presence of an
informational ordering.

The groups with superior information gained at the

expense of those with inferior information.

In contrast, had it been the case

that type A gained at the expense of type B, which gained at the expense of type
C, which in turn gained at the expense of type A, then arguments based on
informational asymmetry would have been difficult to make.
An alternative explanation to asymmetric information for the disparate performance
of the various trader-types is default risk.

Perhaps the finding that speculator

groups tend to do badly reflects a "default risk premium" associated with their
creditworthiness.

Entry into speculation in this market requires far less capital

than entry into refining or undersea oil production.

In the absence of a
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clearinghouse and the daily posting of margins to protect against default risk
("marking-to-market"), a large enough paper loss might leave lightly capitalised
traders unable to fulfill their contractual obligations.
To investigate the possibility that our results -arise from differential default
risk, rather than asymmetric information, we examined incentives to default among
lightly-capitalised trading companies, assigning all the transactions among
hedgers to a "low-risk" group, and transactions between hedgers and speculators,
to a "high-risk" group.

For each transaction, we computed a measure of the

incentive to default by assuming that traders could walk away from their
contractual obligations cost1ess1y.

Cost1ess default can be modeled as an

implicit option in the forward contract. The incentive to default on each contTact
was estimated by using standard techniques to value an implicit put option for the
seller and an implicit call option for the buyer when the contract was signed. 32
When the values of the default option are compared between groups for each
contract maturity in each subperiod, the differences are almost all economically
and statistically insignificant. 33 Given that these option values overestimate the
incentive to default, by assuming that default is costless, we conclude that
differences in default-risk premia cannot explain our search-account results.

32The Black-Scholes option valuation formula was used. with price volatility estimated from historical futures
prices (supplemented by implicit volatility estimates from crude oil options prices from the start of options
trading in 1986).

Since we are comparing values between groups, any errors arising from the appropriateness of the

Black-Scholes formula's assumptions should be at most second order.

See Phillips and Weiner (1990) for further

discussion.
330f the 40 differences (13 subperiods. each with an average of about 3 contract maturities with enough
observations to compute standard errors) between the "low risk" and "high risk" groups in mean default-option
value, only 3 were significant at the 5% level (one-tailed test), and one of these had the wrong sign.

Three-

fourths of these differences were less than $0.01 per barrel; the maximum difference over all subperiods and
contract maturities was only $0.14 per barrel. in comparison with a typical contract price of $20 per barrel.

I.
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VII.

Conclusion

Our finding of no significant profits or losses on the holding (interday) account
does not support the theory of normal backwardation, because hedgers do not pay
for, and speculators do not receive, fees for insurance provision.

Such a result

is stronger here than in a futures market, because entry into speculation in the
Brent forward market is limited by the large transaction size and absence of a
clearinghouse and right to close out positions automatically through offsetting
transactions, implying the necessity to be able to operate in the cash market.

If

the risk premia predicted by normal-backwardation are not present here, they are
even less likely to be found in a futures market, where ease of entry into
speculation tends to reduce or eliminate speculators' returns to bearing risk.
The absence of significant profits, and the lack of forecasting ability, however,
are also inconsistent with views based on asymmetric information from one day to
the next.

These results differ from those of previous researchers, who have found

support for the normal-backwardation theory) in one case (Chang 1985), and that
hedgers actually made mon(y on what we term the holding account in another
(Hartzmark 1987).34
In analysing performance based on individual transactions, we find evidence
supportive of the asymmetric-information view of forward and futures markets.
major oil companies posted significant profits.

The

This finding is not entirely

surprising, as the majors operate the Brent delivery system, which implies
deciding on how many cargoes will be lifted each month, as well as when during the

34 An

alternative explanation for our results is that both asymmetric information and normal backwardation hold in

this market, and just happen to cancel, explaining the insignificant results obtained above on the holding account.
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.
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month each producing company's oil will be 1ifted. 35 The majors also produce the
bulk of the oil in the Brent fields, as suggested by the fact that they hold most
of the net short position, as can be seen in Table 2A.

If any group is likely to

have access to more information than the others, it is the majors.

It appears,

however, that the value of this information does not extend beyond the end of the
trading day.

As noted above, this result is consistent with the time pattern of

information dissemination in this market--dea1s made during the day are widely
reported only at day's end.
We can gain insight into trader heterogeneity by comparing the performance of our
four types of trading companies. 36 Of the four speculator groups, three posted
significant losses; only the Japanese trading houses posted the gains predicted by
the view that the trading companies' advantage lies in gathering and interpreting
information rapidly.

Of the losers, the easiest to explain is the "unidentified"

group of traders, who are the most likely to have inferior information.

The very

fact of being assigned to this category indicates that a company is not in the
market often enough to be known to the market surveyors.

That this group lost

money every period is also supportive of an intraday asymmetric-information view.
35The oil is in common pools under the North Sea, with property rights determined by the fraction of the field
owned by each producer. Delivery takes place through lifting the oil from undersea pipelines to the loading
platform, and then to the tanker. Lifting schedules are decided upon a month in advance. Accounts in the trade
press suggest that the supply is price-inelastic, but fluctuates from month to month for a variety of reasons
(primarily weather- and maintenance-related) not directly related to oil prices. For an example of how decisions
regarding the market can affect prices, see the trade paper Weekly Petroleum Argus (1993, p.12): "The announcement
of a 55 cargo July Brent programme, 17 cargoes more than in June and on the high end of market expectations,
exacerbated the already bearish mood."
36The shosha historically have handled a large fraction of Japanese exports and imports.

The expertise of the Wall

Street banks, which have included Bear Stearns, Chase Manhattan, Drexel, J. Aron (Goldman Sachs), and Morgan
Stanley, is in financial deals.

Other trading companies arose primarily from within the oil industry, from the

transport and trading divisions of the majors and large integrated companies.

The unidentified category,

comprising occasional market participants, also consists of trading companies, as it is unlikely to include finms
with production or refining capacity.

· "-
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Explaining the performance of the Wall Street banks is more difficult.

It is

possible that the fees they collected from the clients on whose behalf they trade
were more than enough to offset the $3.6 million they lost on the search account.
The diversity of traders' experiences suggests that lumping them together as
"speculators," or "non-commercials," as in the CFTC reporting system, is not
useful for the purpose of economic analysis, and likely to obscure more than it
reveals regarding trading performance.

Our results also suggest that differential

default risk does not account for the diversity of trader performance.
this diversity remains an unanswered question, and a subject for future
investigation.

Explaining
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APPENDIX:

~.

NONPARAMETRIC TESTS OF FORE~STING ABILITY (continued)

Shosha

FUTURES PRICE MOVEMENT
down
up
tota1
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TRADER
POSITION
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long
total

sum of conditional
p-value • .57

pr~babilities

Trading Company
TRADER
POSITION
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long
total
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APPENDIX:

NONPARAMETRIC TESTS OF FORE~STING ABILITY (continued)
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